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In lIeu of an IntroduCtIon
It’s hard to find a Ukrainian who has not heard about this problem, a journalist 
who has not written about it, or a politician who has not tried to do something 
about it—Ukraine’s low birthrate and the continuing decline of its population 
numbers. Lately, only the economic crisis and pervasive corruption can com-
pete with this issue for the amount of space devoted in the press. We all know 
that at one time we were “52 million” and that we need to “make love or the 
country won’t have enough astronauts.”
Indeed, the demographic crisis in Ukraine is no less serious than the difficult 
economic one. The question of how to improve the demographic situation has 
remained an urgent issue since soviet times. The platforms of all leading politi-
cal parties contain nearly identical planks regarding the necessity to improve 
the situation by increasing the birthrate. Politicians from different camps com-
pete with one another by promising ever-larger childbirth benefits from the 
state.
This kind of simplistic approach to what is possibly the most complicated social 
phenomenon, demographic processes, is striking, at the least. In a way, our poli-
ticians bring to mind medieval doctors who, without burdening themselves with 
accurate diagnoses of diseases, immediately launched into bloodletting. Of 
course, for most people, this brought temporary relief, some felt no easing at 
all, and others were done more harm than good. In order to cure a disease, sur-
gical intrusion is not necessarily the solution. What is necessary, though, is to 
establish all the symptoms, make the correct diagnosis, and select the best com-
bination of medicines and therapeutic procedures for treatment. Why do we 
continue to reach for the lancet, when developed countries have long limited 
themselves to pills?
Ukraine’s low birthrate and the consequent shrinking and graying of its popula-
tion are only one of the symptoms of the demographic illness that Ukraine and 
all of Europe are suffering from. Yet most of the efforts of both our politicians 
and those in other countries are directed only at it. The reason is simple: other 
demographic challenges, such as high mortality and uncontrolled migration, 
are less responsive to political intervention and tend to thus remain outside the 
focus of most politicians. Instead, raising the birthrate offers an opportunity to 
relatively swiftly and easily produces visible results. And that offers easy politi-
cal dividends.
For this reason, we will look at this most politicized aspect of Ukraine’s demo-
graphic situation in this first issue of Policy Studies, the new ICPS quarterly.
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Without any doubt, Ukraine’s declining population is not a problem that can or 
should be ignored. Still, in order to come up with the best policies, it is neces-
sary to understand the nature of this phenomenon and the reasons behind it, to 
assess the effectiveness of any possible course of action and its potential impact, 
and to remember the most important maxim of the physician: To do no harm!
Demographic myths
Myth #1. A declining population is an evil that must be fought
The main problem on the planet today is not depopulation but its opposite, a 
population explosion. Based on current trends, the population of the world will 
reach 10 billion by 2050 and nearly 15 billion by 2100. This clearly has cata-
strophic implications for all of humanity. Most likely, from the point-of-view of 
sustainable demographic systems, the scenario is one in which the population 
of the earth gradually goes down as the birthrate declines and returns to the 
more balanced level that was seen before the population began to multiply 
radically. This kind of scenario makes the low and extremely low birthrates in 
Europe and North America an inevitable, unavoidable phase in evolution. In 
short, what we need is not to fight low birth rates, as this is not really possible 
anyway, but to learn to live in our new demographic circumstances.
Myth #2. Depopulation can be resolved through government action
Declining populations have presented a challenge to developed countries for 
decades already. These countries have all the possible economic and scientific 
tools in the world at their disposal. Indeed, several generations of political lead-
ers have tried very hard to overcome the “demographic crisis.” Yet there hasn’t 
been a single instance where political means succeeded in increasing the birth-
rate to even the replacement level. To this day, the only effective means of main-
taining a stable population and workforce remains immigration. It is precisely 
because of first-generation immigrants and high birthrates in second- and third-
generation immigrant populations that countries like France and the United 
States have not only avoided depopulation but have seen their population 
numbers grow.
#1, 2010  Policy Studies 
Myth #3. If we pay more, more babies will be born
Long-term experience in many countries has shown that even the most gener-
ous childbirth benefits are unable to ensure a real improvement in the demo-
graphic situation. The stimulus to have children that such socio-demographic 
policies appear to provide turns out to be mostly a matter of moving up the 
“family planning calendar.” That is, women decide to have a child sooner than 
they had originally planned. Any real change in the birthrate only appears 
among older women of childbearing age who face nature’s “now or never” ulti-
matum. Shifting the family planning calendar generally results in a later dip in 
the birthrate and to unpredictable reproductive behavior.
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ukraIne’s BIrthrate: 
InevItaBle or CoInCIdental?
Explaining the inexplicable
It’s actually not difficult to produce a slew of reasons why the birthrate is low in 
Ukraine and the country’s population is in decline. Among them are the chaos 
of the 1990s, the low standard of living, lack of certainty in the future, problems 
with reproductive health, insufficient or inadequate housing, a crisis in the nu-
clear family and the transition to a more individualistic lifestyle, and many oth-
er more-or-less significant factors.
What’s harder to explain is the difficult demographic situation that has emerged 
over the last few decades in all developed countries without exception. Their 
development is also not without its flaws, but it is unlikely that these can explain 
the manifold difference in birthrates between the most developed countries in 
the world and the least.
The fact that the highest birthrates are generally seen in those countries with the 
poorest living conditions also merits some explanation. The nominal division of 
countries according to the intensity and extensiveness of population growth is 
too crude to thoroughly reveal the demographic processes observed in Asia, Af-
rica and Latin America in their entirety.
Attempts to explain complicated demographic phenomena by listing simplistic 
reasons have proved inadequate both at a global level and at the level of individ-
ual countries such as Ukraine. Factors that are seen as decisive in the demo-
graphic situation may indeed be so but they do not exist in isolation from each 
other or from any number of other economic, social, societal and cultural fac-
tors that too often remain outside the discussion. Likewise, the demographic 
trends that they affect are not limited to individual cities, regions or countries. 
Failing to understand these global and all-reaching links or ignoring them will 
distort the results of any analysis and lead to flawed conclusions.
Can’t see the forest for the trees
Any phenomenon can be explained from two points of view: factors and sys-
tems. Moreover, they do not exclude but complement each other. Looking at 
factors makes it possible to discover the underlying conditions that have the 
most impact on a given process. Looking at systems brings together factors that 
have a greater and lesser impact in the context of a single system that operates 
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according to a single set of rules. This is true even in the context of determining 
the causes underlying demographic processes.
Problems begin to arise when researchers and theorists cannot see the forest for 
the trees and try to affect isolated elements in the process, forgetting their sys-
temic nature. This flawed approach is then passed along to politicians who ap-
ply their studies and theories. This is precisely what happened in Ukraine with 
demographic policy: it has become hostage to the factorial approach to explain-
ing demographic processes.
Of course, this situation is quite understandable, given that, from the time that 
Ukraine became independent until the last few years, a number of key condi-
tions have had a defining impact on the country’s demographic situation. In-
deed, why look for other explanations for the declining birthrate when most of 
the population was living below the poverty line and barely made enough to 
feed itself? Yet the limitations of such an approach became quite obvious when 
strong economic growth failed to lead to a rise in the birthrate in Ukraine that 
was strong enough to overcome declining population numbers.
System error
So far, scientific analysis of demographic processes and the search for practical 
policy measures to influence them have been dominated by the theory of demo-
graphic transition. This takes as its basic premise a significant decline in mor-
tality rates and an increase in life expectancy, which began in some European 
countries at the end of the 18th century and has been gradually spreading 
around the globe. As a result, this theory explains demographic trends as the 
need to switch from balancing high birthrates against high mortality rates, 
which was common in the previous stages of human development. The new 
stage involved establishing a balance between low mortality rates and low 
birthrates.
Still, the theory of demographic transition has proved unable to answer the con-
tinuing decline in the birthrate in developed countries—to the point where it is 
below the natural replacement rate. Getting close to this level is the strategic 
goal of demographic policy in most countries that are seeing their population 
numbers go down. Despite having a considerable share of global financial, in-
dustrial and intellectual resources at their disposal, none of these countries has 
so far been able to even approach the natural replacement level.
This turn of events not only casts doubt on the capacity of the theory of demo-
graphic transition to offer a reliable basis for undertaking public policy to regu-
late the birthrate, but could even be a direction marker for those countries who 
are just beginning to move down this path. Whether it makes sense for Ukraine 
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to walk into the same pitfalls that Europe and North America fell into nearly 
half a century ago is largely a rhetorical question. A more interesting question—
whether we should recognize a low birthrate as a reality, learn to live with it and 
even to take advantage of it like, say, the force of gravity—is only now beginning 
to be considered around the world.
The birthrate through history
By its very nature, the theory of demographic transition belongs to systemic 
theories, that is, those that look at demographic changes, not as the impact of 
individual factors but as a consequence of the systemic transformation of a so-
ciety. In this sense, it is an alternative to factorial explanations of demographic 
trends, including a declining birthrate, which continue to dominate the aware-
ness of both politicians and voters.
Any social system or its key subsystems, of which demography is one, is capable 
of self-regulation and self-equilibration. This statement does not in any way 
contradict the notion that there are external factors that affect demographic 
behavior. The question is—how many of these factors are there and how do they 
interact among themselves? The difference between a systemic approach and a 
factorial one lies precisely in the understanding that there are too many factors 
and that the impact of any one of them alone is not enough to move the system 
from stasis. Moreover, these factors do not simply operate in parallel but are 
closely intertwined. A change in one of them simultaneously changes all the 
others and the demographic system reacts to the cumulative effect of the multi-
plicity of these factors.
The extreme reduction in mortality that began around the world during the de-
mographic transition violated an equilibrium that had governed the demo-
graphic system for thousands of years and ensured a high birthrate among hu-
mans. Now, this high birthrate began to pose a threat to the existence of human 
society. Indeed, the crisis in many socio-cultural institutions intended to sup-
port a high replacement rate, including marital and familial ties, gender roles 
and so on, was linked to the search for responses to these challenges.
A low birthrate: Evil or good?
As strange as it may seem, using Ukraine as an example when the country has 
lost around 10% of its population in less than 20 years of independence, the 
main demographic problem in the 21st century is not depopulation at all, but a 
global population explosion. Based on current trends, in the 150-year period 
between 1900 and 2050, the population of the Earth will have risen sixfold. To 
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date, no one has tried to anticipate the economic, political and social conse-
quences of this.
Thus, the main flaw with the theory of demographic transition is its inability to 
explain post-transition demographic processes, that is, when the birthrate falls 
well below the death rate. Indeed, how can we talk about a system self-regulat-
ing when not a single generation that was born in most European countries 
since the first decade of the 20th century has replaced itself?
Still, the key question to understanding demographic processes is to determine 
the limits of the demographic system, including its geographical and political 
limits. For a long time, it was believed that the demographic transition would 
take place in every country separately or, in rare cases, for a group of homoge-
neous countries. Yet the flaw with this approach is especially obvious in the age 
of globalization, when the borders among countries are becoming more and 
more porous and are placing fewer and fewer restrictions on economic, migra-
tional, social and cultural exchange. Thus, only the population of the entire 
planet can really be considered a closed system to which the notion of demo-
graphic self-regulation can be applied.
The demographic future
The balance in the Earth’s population was disturbed by the demographic boom 
that began at the start of the 20th century. In terms of the sustainability of the 
system, a given system needs to set in motion certain internal mechanisms to 
return to a state of equilibrium. In this context, the most logical and likely pre-
sumption is that after the demographic boom, the wave it raised will have to 
come down. That is, the Earth’s population will not simply stabilize at a new 
level but will gradually return to the previous base. This is the typical progres-
sion of an explosion.
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Chart 1. World population (UN projection)
billions
This is precisely the scenario for the UN’s long-term projection to 2300. It pre-
dicts that in the second half of this century the world population will begin to go 
into a long-term decline on a global scale. Some evidence for this scenario can 
already be seen in the major decline in China’s birthrate. Current demographic 
trends give reason to believe that, soon, India, Brazil and other world popula-
tion leaders will soon join it. According to this version of the UN demographic 
projection, the world population will shrink to 2.3 billion by 2300, which is 
about where it was before the population explosion began. In this way, the 
Earth’s demographic system will reach a new state of equilibrium.
Looking at other scenarios in the UN population forecast, it is worth noting 
that the high projection implies that the population explosion is a permanent 
phenomenon that will destroy humanity sooner or later. But self-destruction is 
not normally one of the characteristics of social systems. The medium projec-
tion matches the theory of demographic transition. However, a chronically in-
sufficient birthrate in most developed countries makes this particular projection 
highly improbable.
If we ignore the various apocalyptic hypotheses, there is only one path that 
might bring the population of planet Earth to a new, equilibrated quantity: a 
birthrate that is well below the replacement level. And this is precisely what we 
have been seeing in most countries of Europe for some time now. This seems 
also to be the path that most countries in the world are heading down. Yet this 
is what Ukraine’s politicians are pointlessly trying to prevent, because they do 
not see that they are behaving somewhat like the Persian Emperor Xerxes, who 
demanded that the sea be punished because it had sunk his ships.
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there’s fewer of us all the tIme... 
Demographic challenges in Ukraine
Ukraine’s population has been in decline since 1993. The independent replace-
ment of the population, that is, a state where there were more people born than 
died, had been disrupted some years earlier, but positive migrational flows, such 
as the return of deported Crimean Tatars, kept this weakening indicator from 
slipping into the negative.
Chart 2.  Permanent population
millions
Source: Derzhkomstat
A steep decline in the standard of living, growing unemployment and home-
lessness, along with uncertainty in what the next day would bring dampened an 
already far-from-ideal demographic situation. Most of all, this had an impact 
on the birthrate and on life expectancy.
43.0
44.0
45.0
46.0
47.0
48.0
49.0
50.0
51.0
52.0
53.0
20092008200720062005200420032002200120001999199819971996199519941993199219911990
14 Where Do the Children Come From: Using policy to raise the birthrate in Ukraine
Chart 3.  Life expectancy
years
Source: Derzhkomstat
In 1990, the total fertility rate (the number of children per woman of childbear-
ing age) was 1.84, although the replacement rate is 2.1. Actually, this indicator 
was around 2.0, although it was already falling to 1.91 in urban areas. By the 
1990’s, fertility among Ukraine’s women was in steady decline, reaching only 
1.085 by 2001. In Ukraine’s cities, it had fallen below 1.0, becoming effectively 
the only example of such a low birthrate in the world.2
An economic recovery that raised a large part of Ukraine’s population from be-
low the poverty line led to a rise in the birthrate to the point where it was more 
than 34% above its low point. Yet this revival has not been as lively as other baby 
booms registered in Ukraine in the last century. In 2008, the total birthrate was 
1.458, which was lower than the same indicator for 1994 and well below the 
natural replacement rate.
1 The need to stop the trend towards an ever-lower birthrate caused the soviet govern-
ment to introduce a number of measures back in November 1982 to increase state 
assistance to families with children: partly paid leave taken to take care of children 
up to one year of age and unpaid leave for childcare up to 18 months. The monthly 
assistance equivalent for paid childcare leave amounted to 20% of the average 
monthly pay for ordinary workers and civil servants and over 25% of the pay of a 
farmworker at that time (this was actually the largest benefit paid to families with 
children at that time).
2 In demographic research, a new term appeared at this point, lowest fertility rate, 
referring to a total birthrate coefficient around 1.0.
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Chart 4.  Total fertility rate
birthrate per woman of childbearing age
Source: Derzhkomstat
When we talk about the need to improve the demographic situation, it is impor-
tant to clearly understand what goal we are trying to reach. A natural rise in the 
population can no longer be considered a self-evident goal. In an agrarian cul-
ture, there was demand for large numbers of unskilled workers, while countries 
in the 19th and 20th centuries additionally wanted a large standing army. To-
day’s economic and political environment no longer generates that kind of de-
mand. Moreover, the question of ecological balance and minimizing the ruin-
ous effects on the environment demands that we rapidly reduce pressures on the 
ecosystem.
The main problem facing Ukraine is not the absolute size of the country’s pop-
ulation, but its quality, especially the breakdown by age. World wars, artificial 
famines and negative economic and social conditions have all led to the emer-
gence of waves in the age curve. This means that the growth of total demand for 
goods and services is not even and industrial capacities are either not fully uti-
lized in certain years or there are shortages. As more numerous generations 
reach retirement age, the existing pension system causes additional pressure on 
the working-age population.
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Chart 5.  Population aged 14–22, start of 2000 / 2009
individuals
Source: Derzhkomstat
By 2007–2008, Ukraine had reached the birthrate levels similar to other coun-
tries in Europe. This was partly due to the birth of children that couples had 
been postponing and the coming into childbearing age of the last generation 
born under the USSR, in 1983-1987. Meanwhile, the death rate is far ahead of 
that in the European Union. This is especially true of the high mortality rate 
among able-bodied men3 in Ukraine, which also has a negative impact on the 
labor market.
Ukraine’s place in world demographic trends
According to UN data, the last few decades have seen the birthrate retreat all 
over the world. The situation is particularly felt in Europe, where in most coun-
tries the total birthrate is below the natural replacement rate.
3 The higher mortality of men is the difference between the death rate of women and 
men in a specific age group during a given period.
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
900,000
2000 2009
Age
10 2 43 5 76 8 109 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
#1, 2010  Policy Studies 1
Chart 6.  Total fertility rate by country
Source: OECD
The average weighted birthrate for countries in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) was 1.63 in 2005, after averaging 1.64 
over 1995–2005 and 1.84 over 1985–1995. Among the 30 OECD countries, 
only four had a birthrate over 2.0.4
Experts say the reason for this significant decline in the birthrate is a major shift 
in the worldviews of humans in a post-industrial society. In order to offer a suit-
able theoretical explanation of the current and future situation, a hypothesis 
was put forth, calling the situation in Europe “The Second Demographic Tran-
sition.” Similar concepts are being proposed under a hypothesis called the fifth 
phase of demographic transition.5
4 The US, Turkey, Mexico and New Zealand.
5 The fifth phase is a term given to the development of events after the conclusion of 
the fourth phase in the theory of the (first) demographic transition. In the fourth 
phase, the death rate increases to where it is equal to the birthrate, that is, the process 
of demographic stabilization is complete.
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Chart 7.  Average weighted fertility rate in OECD countries, 
 1970–2005
births per woman of childbearing age (15–49)
Source: OECD
The authors of the concept of a second  demographic transition, P. Lesthaeghe 
and D. van de Kaa,6 showed that the modern demographic situation and its 
main feature—a birthrate that is below the simple replacement rate—are driven 
by fundamentally different reasons than the declining birthrate registered dur-
ing the first demographic transition in the 19th century.7 In the 1970s, Europe 
entered a new phase in its demographic history. Unexpected changes in the sit-
uation in the mid-1960s, especially a decline in the total fertility rate to below 
natural replacement levels, signaled the start of this second demographic tran-
sition. The post-war baby boom had ended somewhat earlier and led to a long-
term trend to a gradually declining birthrate.
Researchers are not of one mind about the underlying reasons for the second 
demographic transition, but the most widespread view is that it was the result of 
a broad shift to individualistic values and the consequent change of behavioral 
norms, including demographic behavior. The level of personal freedom has in-
creased significantly, both regarding personal choices and the means of attain-
ing them. The second demographic transition is the result of a movement in 
6 D. van de Kaa, “Europe’s Second Demographic Transition,” Population Bulletin 
42, 1987, pp. 1–59.
7 Declining mortality followed by a declining birthrate.
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mass consciousness to greater tolerance and receptiveness of new values and 
new models of behavior.
Four main features characterize this transition:
a transition from the “Golden Age” of the institution of marriage to its de-
cline, that is, the widespread practice of couples setting up house without 
the benefit of a legal marriage and of alternative forms of family configura-
tions;
a transition from child-centric family models to individualistically-oriented 
“mature” parental partners with only a single child;
a transition from preventive contraception intended to avoid early pregnan-
cies to the deliberate planning of the birth of each child;
a transition from a “standard” nuclear family to a pluralistic model.
In this way, demographic changes in the 1960s were the result of changes in the 
behaviors of both individual men and women and couples. Similar changes in 
marital and childbearing patterns were seen in Ukraine as well. The share of 
children born out of wedlock grew from 11.2% in 1990 to 20.9% by 2008. This 
matches overall European trends away from the classic marriage to other forms 
of cohabiting.
The average age of first marriages in Ukraine has grown over the last 20 years, 
although it remains lower than in most European countries. For instance, the 
average age of couples entering their first marriage is 23.5 in Ukraine, com-
pared to 24-25 in Central and Eastern Europe and over 27 in Western Europe. 
The postponement of marriage “for later” and the disinclination of some por-
tion of young people to marry at all are partly in response to socio-economic 
factors and show a tendency to grow, although they remain exceptional.
Ukraine continues to be one of the leaders in Europe for the number of regis-
tered marriages per 1,000 of population: an average of 7.3 over 2002–2008.8 
Still, the divorce rate is also significantly higher than in the rest of Europe: 3.7 
per 1,000 for that same period.
8 Only Russia and Belarus have higher rates.
•
•
•
•
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Chart 8.  Marriage and divorce rates, 1990–2008
per 1,000 of population
Source: Derzhkomstat
In Ukraine, as in other countries in Europe, the trend is for unregistered mar-
riages to increasingly form families, a consequence of difficult transformation 
processes affecting marital and family relations as well as a reduced state role in 
regulating personal lives. The Ukrainian census of 2001 recorded that 7% of 
men and women living as couples had not registered their marriages. Moreover, 
among the very young (15–19) this share is quite significant: 25.3% among 
young men and 19.2% among young women. This suggests that new forms of 
marital unions are more widespread among young Ukrainians. Clearly, the un-
registered couple is no longer seen by society as an anomaly. Unregistered mar-
riages are the most common in southern and eastern Ukraine, while they re-
main fairly untypical in the western region.
In 2008, 79.1% of newborns were born to parents in a legal marriage. With age, 
the share of babies born in wedlock tends to rise for mothers aged 15 through 
24, then begins to fall off gradually. This is due to both the considerable rate of 
divorce among 25–25 year-olds and the deliberate choice of single women to 
have children by the time they are 30. Interestingly, the percentage of children 
born out of wedlock is nearly the same for each age group of mothers, regardless 
of whether they are urban or live in the countryside.
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Chart 9.  Share of children born in wedlock in 2008
%
Source: Derzhkomstat; calculations: ICPS
Because single mothers typically have below-average incomes, raising children 
becomes more difficult in such families. One of the main negative consequenc-
es of the collapse of marriages is that children are very often deprived of one of 
their parents, usually the father. Most married couples who break up have chil-
dren and this means that, every year, a large number of children suffer through 
their parents’ divorce.
Although the majority of such children is gradually going down, this is not re-
lated to a decline in the number of break-ups but to a decline in the number of 
children being born. The number and proportion of broken families raising mi-
nor children in Ukraine is huge. Every fourth family with underage children is 
incomplete, while in cities the proportion is even higher: every third family.9
The high divorce rate, including among couples with minor children, emerged 
back in the 1970s, a demographic behavioral trend that has continued all the 
years since then: easy to marry and easy to divorce. For the overall divorce rate, 
Ukraine and Russia lead in Europe.
Over 2000–2008, the age breakdown of mothers shifted. The average age at 
which a woman gave birth to a child began to rise. This was primarily the result 
of women finally having the children they had been postponing.
9 The share of Ukraine’s population according to marital status is based on data from 
the 2001 national census.
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Chart 10.  Birthrate and age of mother, 2000–2008
per annum per 100,000 women
Source: Derzhkomstat; calculations: ICPS
The shift in the age of first birth from 21 to 23 years of age seems to mostly be 
connected to improved expectations of the future, especially from the point of 
view of raising children in young families, on one hand, and postponed mar-
riages among young people, on the other.
Despite the similarity in demographic trends in Europe as a whole and in 
Ukraine, there are some major differences. One of the primary ones is the fact 
that, in Ukraine, there are few people who remain childless, yet there are many 
families with only one child.10
According to various polls,11 most Ukrainian women feel pressure from their 
parents and their circle to have at least one child before they turn 30 in order not 
to be considered an Old Maid and not to have problems with their reproductive 
health. Many women are afraid of running into health problems that might 
complicate pregnancy at an older age or even make it impossible altogether.
10 The number of families with no children or two or more children is higher in Western 
Europe.
11 For example, KIIS (2001) “1999 Ukraine Reproductive Health Survey: Final Re-
port,” Kyiv, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, US Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, and USAID.
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Chart 11.  Birth order and place of residence, 2008
Source: Derzhkomstat; calculations: ICPS
Still, once their first child has been born, many families are in no rush to move 
on and have a second one. Most likely this is connected to the difficulty raising 
a child in the current socio-economic environment. Most Ukrainians think it’s 
more important to raise one child well than to raise many children simply for 
the sake of doing so. Still, surveys have shown12 that most respondents13 would 
prefer to have two children.
At the same time as the birthrate improved noticeably in the 2000’s, mortality 
remains a significant problem. According to the CIA World Factbook, the death 
rate in Ukraine is better than that of only one other country in Europe, Russia. 
Higher death rates can only be seen in Afghanistan and in Central Africa. In the 
case of natural population growth (fertility minus mortality), the situation is 
even worse.
In terms of net natural population growth, Ukraine is in last place in the world. 
This sad record is primarily the result of a low average life expectancy rate at 
birth. Notably, in the 1960s, Ukraine was ahead of many countries in Western 
Europe.
12 Brienna Perelli-Harris, “Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain 
times,” Demographic Research, 2008, Vol. 19, Article 29, рp. 1145-1178.
13 66% of women and 64% of men.
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Chart 12.  Fertility, mortality and natural growth  
 in selected countries, 2006
annually, per 1,000 population
Source: CIA World Factbook
Of course, the rate of mortality depends not only on the level of health in the 
population but also its age breakdown: all things being equal, the older a popu-
lation, the higher its mortality. Still, this factor alone is not enough to explain 
Ukraine’s high mortality rate. For instance, the population of developed coun-
tries is noticeably older than Ukraine’s: In 2005, the population of Japan con-
sisted of 26.5% persons 60 years of age and older; in Germany, it was 24.9%, in 
Austria 21.9%, and in France, 20.9%. Ukraine was not much different, with 
20.6%. Still, mortality in those developed countries was around half of 
Ukraine’s14 for that same year. This suggests that Ukraine’s high mortality rate 
is not only and not so much the graying of the population, but because of a high 
mortality in younger age groups.
14 Austria’s death rate was 9.3 per 1,000 population, France 8.6, Germany 10.3 and 
Japan 9.1. Ukraine’s was 16.
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PolItICal resPonses 
to demograPhIC Challenges
Policy options: Basic socio-demographic models
In research circles, socio-demographic policy is a set of measures at the state 
level that are intended to establish the optimal population dynamic and popula-
tion breakdown for the country. Consequently, socio-demographic policy can 
be aimed at increasing, decreasing or maintaining the stability of the size of the 
population. Socio-demographic policy affects:
the formation of a population replacement regime that is desirable for soci-
ety: maintaining or changing the size and structure of the population and 
the dynamic of related changes;
the family profile of the population and the processes of internal and exter-
nal migration.
A huge variety of measures and instruments in demographic policy is used by 
different countries with greater or lesser depth. Still, despite globalization, de-
mographic challenges and political responses, the tendency to lean towards 
classic, “ideal” regimes15 remains typical of most countries and reflects the re-
lated socio-cultural values espoused by their societies.
Table 1.  Basic socio-demographic policy approaches
Social-democratic Paternalistic Liberal
Providing support Universal At work Surplus principle
Public spending High High Low
Influencing labor 
market
High employment, 
high pay
Low employment, 
high pay
High employment, 
low pay
Countries Austria, Finland, 
France, Holland, 
Norway,Sweden
Germany, 
Switzerland, Japan
Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, UK, US 
In Scandinavia, there is a general expectation that the state will satisfy people’s 
social needs on a universal basis, whereas in the US, the expectation is that the 
state provides support only to the most underprivileged social groups. A corpo-
ratist regime provides for more active involvement by non-state actors such as 
15 A socio-demographic policy regime is a conceptual approach to understanding and 
carrying out the social functions of the state. This, in turn, is distinguished by its 
ideological orientation and political traditions that are upheld by one society or an-
other.
•
•
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unions and employers’ associations in enacting both social policy as a whole 
and its demographic components.
The general tendency that is widespread across all types of demographic policy 
is a clash between growing expectations regarding state support on the part of 
the country’s citizens and efforts to optimize their economic purpose, usually 
leading to cutbacks in the related expenditures. Moreover, demographic policy 
practice in countries with transition economies and developing economies is 
outside the framework of traditional classifications, although they do tend to 
move towards one of the three regimes presented in the table.
Depending on the demographic situation in a country, socio-demographic pol-
icy can be equally directed at increasing or decreasing the birthrate. Given that 
the problem of stimulating fertility is urgent for Ukraine and other countries in 
Europe, we will only look at relevant instruments and models16 of world socio-
demographic policy in this paper.
Table 2.  Basic tools of socio-demographic policy
Area Instruments Impact
Economic
Maternity benefits 
Childcare benefits
Regulated maternity / paternity leave pay
•
•
•
Stimulates 
birthrate
Free or discounted insurance for individuals with children
System of mortgages for housing for young families
Paid parental leave 
•
•
•
Supports the 
nuclear family
Social
Regulating working conditions for parents with minor 
children
Family planning programs
•
•
Stimulates 
birthrate
Public housing for young families
Control the material standing of mothers and children 
during marital breakup
Free medical services
•
•
•
Raises the 
standard of 
living
Migration
Institutional migration services that oversee, supervise and 
provide public services in migration matters
Institute economic measures to attract skilled migrants
A database of all forms of migration flows to model a 
promising migration situation
Programs that stimulate educational migration
Increased/decreased timetable for naturalizing migrants
Legalizing illegal migrants
•
•
•
•
•
•
Regulates the 
population 
for both 
quality and 
quantity
16 A socio-demographic policy model is a concrete example of the practical applica-
tion of a socio-demographic regime policy or its combination in individual countries 
or groups of countries.
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Table 3.  Basic models of socio-demographic policy
Models Policy instruments State role
Anglo-Saxon 
(Australia, Great 
Britain, Ireland, New 
Zealand)
Economic: 
loans/discounts for attractive housing;
regulated maternity and paternity 
leave pay; 
maternity benefit 
Social: 
largely free medical services;
public housing for young families
•
•
•
•
•
Policy is supported 
by cooperation with 
private institutions 
who are delegated a 
considerable number of 
social functions
Scandinavian 
(Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden)
Economic:
large social insurance-based maternity 
benefits;
regulated maternity and paternity 
leave pay; 
tax breaks and social contributions;
Social: 
a wide range of free social and medical 
services for the entire population.
•
•
•
•
Ensures the exercise of 
guaranteed rights to 
social protection, carries 
responsibility for the 
functioning of  non-
state social services 
Southern European 
(Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain)
Economic: 
relatively small and time-constrained 
maternity benefits at birth; 
Social:
universal medical services.
•
•
Limited financial 
options in the social 
sphere
Continental 
(Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Holland, 
Luxembourg)
Economic:
cash assistance and social services 
during childbirth based on universal 
contributions to social insurance 
system.
•
Minimal state 
intervention, 
considerable role played 
by employer and special 
socially-oriented funds
American (US) Economic: 
specific maternity benefits only in 
some states;
widespread social/medical insurance;
state assistance to underprivileged 
families;
Social: 
family planning;
program for feeding mothers and 
infants, children (covers 7.9 mn).
•
•
•
•
•
Cooperation between 
state and organized 
market society through 
free association
Japanese Economic: 
maternity benefit: set by insurance 
companies – 66% of daily wage for 42 
days prior to birth and 56 days after 
birth, provided mother stops working;
financial assistance for childcare;
social and medical insurance systems.
•
•
•
Considerable state 
regulation of social 
programs; cooperation 
with employers
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Depending on the intensity of how one or another policy instrument is used, it 
is possible to, nominally at least, distinguish six models of socio-demographic 
policy: Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, Southern European, Continental, Ameri-
can, and Japanese.
Migration policy in the American, Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon models pro-
vides political and civil rights to migrants in their full complement. In the Con-
tinental and Southern European models, the state carries out a policy of func-
tional integration (social citizenship), that is, a migration policy directed at the 
socio-economic integration of migrants into the society. In the Japanese model, 
migration processes are rigidly controlled.
Table 4.  Pros and cons of socio-demographic models
Models Pros Cons
Anglo-Saxon Relatively low tax rates Weak social protection for the 
underprivileged; high cost of 
social programs
Scandinavian Policies affect all social groups High public costs, high tax rates
Southern European Relatively low public cost Marginal social benefits
Continental Social assistance not based 
on contributions and is 
available universally
Weak role of wages as a stimulus; 
principle of mandatory social 
insurance not always upheld
American Decentralized, flexible social 
policy
Absence of nationwide program; 
high spending on social security
Japanese State does not need to offer 
much social assistance to all 
citizens due to high personal 
saving rate and employer 
insurance
Minimal support for the 
underprivileged, effective 
absence of related social 
programs
It turns out that the main weaknesses of all socio-demographic models are the 
high cost of social programs and/or the weak social support for underprivileged 
groups of the population. Some of the benefits of socio-demographic policy 
models can be that they cover all social groups, that they offer many social pro-
grams, or that their policies do not cost much to put into effect.
The most costly model of socio-demographic policy is the Scandinavian one. 
Despite the considerable expenditures involved, the advantage of this model is 
its high effectiveness and the fact that it encompasses the entire population. 
These countries spend approximately 1.9% of GDP17 on social benefits.
17 Here and further, the source of the presented data is Demoskop Weekly, a demo-
graphic journal (demoscope.ru).
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The American and Japanese models do not place many demands on the State 
Budget. These models are more liberal, but one of their main weaknesses is that 
they tend to be directed at only those groups of the population who are capable 
of paying for access to a variety of social support programs. To put into play one 
of these models a necessary condition is to already have a high standard of liv-
ing. Social spending by these countries adds up to only 0.8% of GDP.
In the Anglo-Saxon and Continental models, the main emphasis is on coopera-
tion between the state and employers and associations. Compared to liberal 
models, they are more directed at covering the entire population, but they are 
clearly behind the Scandinavian model. Their social spending budget is around 
1.6% of GDP.
The Southern European model is less costly than the Continental one. This is 
firstly because of the somewhat lower level of development of those countries 
that use this model. The main element of this social model is its focus on sup-
porting the family. Typically, budgeted social spending under this model is very 
low, 0.7% of GDP.
The socio-demographic model used in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries that are currently in a transition phase is also worth noting. Here, the state 
guarantees only a minimal level of social support (basic healthcare system, free 
education) and anything higher comes out of the pocket of the individual. On 
one hand, these changes in social policy create additional incentives for pro-
ductivity to grow. On the other, the main weakness in such a system is that a 
large part of the population remains insufficiently covered social support 
systems.
The political economy of demographic policy in Ukraine
Socio-demographic policy in Ukraine is defined in the Strategy for Demo-
graphic Development for 2006–2015. This was given the green light by the 
Concept of Demographic Development for 2005–2015 and a Ministry of Fam-
ily, Youth and Sport Instruction dated 6 June 2007, “On approving an Action 
Plan for carrying out the Strategy of Demographic Development to 2015.” 
Specific instruments for enacting socio-demographic policy and the means of 
applying it are approved in the Law on the State Budget and other normative 
acts of Ukraine.
In accordance with this legislation, the purpose of socio-demographic policy in 
Ukraine is stated as improving the quality indicators of Ukraine’s population 
and slowing down the pace of depopulation. Ukraine’s Concept of Demo-
graphic Development notes the importance of running a balanced demographic 
policy in the country.
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At the moment, there are four priority areas for socio-demographic policy in 
Ukraine:
improving the demographic situation;
fostering economic conditions that will slow the process of depopulation 
and improve the quality of the population;
encouraging healthy lifestyles;
reviving Ukraine’s spirituality, national values and traditions.
The Ministry Instruction also designates the basic instruments of socio-demo-
graphic  policy in Ukraine:
Table 5.  Basic instruments of demographic policy in Ukraine
Aim Instruments
Economic Gradual paying out of one-time maternity benefit worth 22.6 
minimum living allowances;
Setting a fixed monthly benefit for childcare and a gradual increase 
in the amount.
•
•
Social Monitoring educational and childcare facilities;
Increasing access to pre-school facilities in rural areas;
Setting the conditions for physical education and sports to 
develop on a mass scale.
•
•
•
Migration policy Drafting legal acts and international agreements regarding the 
integration of refugees into Ukrainian society;
Drafting international agreements regarding the social protection 
of citizens with Argentina, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Russia, and 
Turkey;
Signing employment agreements for Ukrainian citizens with 
Argentina, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Italy, and Spain;
Developing programs and projects for the social and professional 
adaptation of Ukrainian citizens who are returning from abroad;
Carrying out a nationwide census in 2011.
•
•
•
•
•
Among all the listed socio-demographic policy measures, the only instrument 
that is really being applied in Ukraine today is the payment of a maternity ben-
efit at childbirth. All the other measures are either inadequate in size to actually 
have any positive impact, such as monthly childcare benefits, or they remain 
nothing more than slogans and declarations rather than real social instruments 
or migration policy components. 
At the same time, the amount of spending to carry out socio-demographic pol-
icy is fairly high, compared to other socio-demographic models, reaching near-
ly 2.0% of GDP.18 In short, Ukraine spends as much as the Scandinavians for 
18 Based on ICPS calculations.
•
•
•
•
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socio-demographic policies that are far less effective than even the least costly 
models.
The fact that the country’s top politicians clearly know about all the available 
instruments of socio-demographic policy, at least on paper, is telling. Indeed, 
this can be readily seen from the promises they have included in their party 
platforms, as the table below shows.
Table 6.  Socio-demographic planks of top politicians
V. Yushchenko  
“Ten steps to help 
the people” (2004)
Y. Tymoshenko 
“Ukrainian breakthrough” 
(200)
V. Yanukovych 
 “Stability and 
well-being” (200)
Tenfold increase in cash 
maternity benefit
Access to credit for 
housing for every 
young urban and rural 
family
•
•
Maternity benefit of UAH 
10,400 for first child, at least 
UAH 15,000 for second 
child, and UAH 25,000 for 
third child;
Monthly childcare benefit 
for up to three years of age 
of at least UAH 500;
Long-term mortgages for 
young families for 25-35  
years at 2-4% p. a.;
Reducing the cost of 
housing construction 
through tax incentives;
Mandatory medical 
insurance.
•
•
•
•
•
Maternity benefit of UAH 
11,700 for first child, UAH 
25,000 for second child, 
and UAH 50,000 for third 
child;
Monthly family allowance 
of UAH 100 per child aged 
3-13 and UAH 200 per child 
aged 13-18;
Option of 10-year rental 
agreements on public 
housing at discounted 
rates for young families.
•
•
•
In practice, however, hardly any of the proposed socio-demographic instru-
ments were actually applied, other than the simplest—and probably the least 
effective one in the long run—, direct incentives for people to have children by 
paying a sizeable maternity benefit.
Policy to incentivize childbearing directly
State assistance at childbirth or maternity benefits does indeed play a major role 
in socio-demographic policy in most developed countries. But it is slowly being 
recognized as one of a broad spectrum of state policy measures intended to re-
duce the risk of poverty and social vulnerability. It is this comprehensive use of 
indirect means to influence the demographic situation, together with direct in-
centives to have children, that generally explain the link between the size of 
maternity benefits and the birthrate in different EU countries.
Most European countries ran into the problem of depopulation long ago and 
have long had solid experience using and combining a wide variety of demo-
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graphic policy instruments. Instead of making the same mistakes as other coun-
tries, Ukraine should take advantage of this. Incidentally, Ukraine has itself also 
gone down the dead end of direct incentives for childbearing and can now take 
satisfaction in the fact that the results are that the age curve demonstrates so 
many ups and downs it looks more like the Dow Jones Index! At least, that was 
the impact of soviet demographic policies in the 1980s.
This significant historical data provides the necessary grounds to draw conclu-
sions about the value of maternity benefits. And these conclusions hardly sup-
port such broad and unquestioning use of this instrument as is currently the 
case in Ukraine. Many studies19 have shown that the cumulative effect of the 
major public expenditures attached to providing maternity benefits at birth is 
typically about a 10% increase in the birthrate over the first 3-5 years, after 
which the effect dies off.
Practice shows that the main change in the reproductive behavior of a popula-
tion that a direct incentive to have children results in is a shift forward in the 
“childbearing schedule.” That is, women decide to have their babies earlier 
than they had planned. This phenomenon actually accounts for the lion’s share 
of the positive effect of such public policies as Ukraine’s political leaders con-
tinue to espouse. And, unfortunately, this is only the first half of the story. The 
second half promises to be much less pleasant.
This second half is the aftereffect of this shift in the “childbearing schedule.” As 
the years pass, this earlier wave is followed by yet another drop in the birthrate 
as a share of the women were simply responding to the generosity of the state by 
bearing their children sooner. So, after rising for a few years and supposedly 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the maternity benefit, the birthrate will then 
begin to decline again. In the end, the effect of this state policy of, essentially, 
rewarding people to have children is largely wiped out.
Moreover, having been distorted by aggressive policy, reproductive behavior 
once more becomes unpredictable. This will make virtually impossible to tell 
which changes in state support, or even changes in the economic situation over-
all, might have a demographic impact. Demographic processes in the European 
part of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s evolved under precisely this 
scenario. The decline in the birthrate, which started in 1989 in the Ukrainian 
SSR and continues today, was so powerful precisely because it combined the 
long-term consequences of careless demographic policies and structural factors 
driven by the break-up of the USSR and the major social upheavals that awaited 
Ukraine.
19 Inter alia, S.V. Zakharov, “Demographic analysis of the effect of family policy mea-
sures in Russia in the1980s.”(in Russian)
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The only way that direct incentives for having children can ensure a real im-
provement in the demographic situation is increasing childbearing among older 
women—those who are about to leave their childbearing years behind. It is on 
account of women who have a choice to either have a baby now or never have 
one at all that any real improvement in the birthrate can be sustainable. This is 
the real result that, despite its many drawbacks outside the set of other socio-
demographic instruments, a direct incentive to have children can offer.
If we compare a demographic system to a complicated mechanism that we are 
trying to fix and socio-demographic policy instruments with a set of repair 
tools, then following our analogy directly stimulating people to have children 
by paying them money, which Ukraine is actively doing at the moment, can be 
compared to grabbing the sledgehammer simply because it is the simplest, and 
at first glance most effective, implement.
Yet any mechanic will assure you that to fix even the simplest mechanism using 
a sledgehammer is impossible. To do so you need any number of more complex 
and less forceful tools. Trying to do something using only a hammer could lead 
to unexpected consequences and completely ruin the mechanism we were try-
ing to fix. Why is it that things that are quite obvious even to an apprentice are 
still invisible and misunderstood by Ukraine’s leadership?
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Into the CaBBage PatCh: 
oPtImIzIng demograPhIC PolICy
In the end, the current socio-demographic policy model used in Ukraine is not 
even clearly distinguished. It requires relatively high public spending, nearly 2% 
of GDP, yet it is not especially effective as other, less costly policies followed by 
other countries. This is mainly because of the lack of proper mechanisms for 
enacting it. Many features of Ukraine’s socio-demographic policy are similar 
to the Southern European model, especially the emphasis on social support for 
the family. At the same time, the level of commitments and expenditures are 
more similar to the Scandinavian model. This is clearly evidence of the coun-
try’s soviet heritage and Ukraine has shown its complete inability to carry such 
a social burden. The majority of these political commitments cannot be carried 
out because of economic limitations.
Based on the socio-demographic policy models we have analyzed, certain con-
clusions can be drawn about which ones make sense to institute in Ukraine. 
Despite their effectiveness, the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon models need 
considerable Budget resources, which is not the best choice for Ukraine be-
cause of its level of economic development.
The liberal models—American and Japanese—need a well-developed system of 
non-state institutions, agencies and funds that can work productively with the 
state in social policy areas. Establishing such a system can become an objective 
of socio-demographic policy in Ukraine, but at the moment the conditions and 
opportunities for this are lacking.
The Continental and, even more so, the Southern European models are closer 
to Ukraine’s economic and social realities, as Ukraine combines a developing 
economy with a developed country’s demographic situation.
Analyzing the drawbacks and advantages of these models, we can conclude that 
the best option for Ukraine will be a blend of the Continental and Southern 
European models of socio-demographic policy. This means the kind of policy 
that combines relatively low demands on the public purse with an orientation 
on support to the family and the option to expand social assistance to all groups 
of the population.
A look at the current demographic situation in Ukraine and the effectiveness of its 
socio-demographic policies makes it clear that the country needs to concretize 
state policy measures and begin the transition from adaptive to active demograph-
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ic policies. This will affect the basic factors underlying the current unsatisfactory 
demographic situation in the country: economic, social, and other factors.
The priorities of Ukraine’s new socio-demographic policies and its policies in 
related areas should include six key objectives:
shifting the focus from directly incentivizing childbearing to indirect means 
of influence;
forming a concept of tax and other incentives in support of families with 
children; 
drafting and institutsng a clear migration policy directed at shaping the de-
sired cultural-ethnic composition of immigrants, providing them with legal 
status, and encouraging educational migration; 
formulating state policy directed at promoting social values: the institution 
of the family, healthy lifestyles, and so on;
reforming the social security system and social welfare by changing the large 
number of privileges by forms of targeted social support;
reformsng the healthcare system by developing a universal package of med-
ical services and a system of paid services, and by instituting mandatory 
health insurance.
Ukraine’s political leadership and analysts can debate without end about which 
model of socio-demographic policy the country should take up, or what politi-
cal instruments are the best. Yet the main question is not even whose point-of-
view will win out or what decision will be taken. Whatever they are, the main 
thing is that their adoption take place in the knowledge of certain fundamentals 
that are decisive for demographic process, not only in this country but in the 
world—and that we stubbornly refuse to notice. 
Firstly, socio-demographic policy is no different than any other area of govern-
ment in the sense that, in order to be effective, we first need to be aware of what 
goal we hope to achieve with it. As long as we continue to live in the snare of 
slogans about 52 million Ukrainians, as long as we refuse to see that world de-
mographic trends indicate that any attempts to spur a major rise in the birthrate 
in one particular country is like fighting windmills, any steps our country takes 
will be little more than quixotic.
And Ukraine can hardly afford to sacrifice such significant amounts of its State 
Budget year after year for results that are anything but certain.
Secondly, we shouldn’t count on buying our way out of a demographic crisis by 
paying 8,000, 10,000 or even 15,000 for every newborn. No other country has 
managed to do so in the past. Maternity benefits from the state are no panacea, 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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but are simply another form of assistance, more social than strictly demograph-
ic in nature.
Moreover, restricting ourselves to this one instrument, on which Ukraine’s en-
tire socio-demographic policy currently is based, is the same as trying to cure a 
complicated and difficult disease using a single pill. Only by putting together a 
comprehensive treatment plan using all possible means in the proper manner 
can we hope, if not improvement, at least for a stabilization in the demographic 
situation.
Indeed, this kind of broad and unrestricted use of direct incentives for having 
children risks stimulating a higher birthrate among the underprivileged and 
marginal segments of the population. This, in turn, could lead to a series of 
negative social outcomes, such as abandoned children, growing homelessness 
among children and so on.
Thirdly, based on conditions today, any socio-demographic policy without a 
migration component makes little sense. Migration has become the same kind 
of indivisible part of demographic processes today as low birthrates in devel-
oped countries. And, like the low birthrate, it makes little sense to try to over-
come or tame migration, as many years of global experience have shown that, 
in both cases, this doesn’t work.
On the contrary, migration is the most effective mechanism to establish a rela-
tive balance between the depopulation of some countries and overpopulation in 
others. It is migration, not political efforts or state support, that will save us 
from the demographic crisis and the loss of workforce in Europe and North 
America. Rather than turning into a holding pen for EU migration rejects, 
Ukraine, too, should learn to use migration process to its own advantage.
